

# Gloucester City Council

<b>Meeting:</b>	<b>Audit &amp; Governance Committee</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>14 March 2016</b>
	<b>Council</b>		<b>24 March 2016</b>
<b>Subject:</b>	<b>Treasury Management Strategy 2016/17</b>		
<b>Report Of:</b>	<b>Cabinet Member for Performance and Resources</b>		
<b>Wards Affected:</b>	<b>All</b>		
<b>Key Decision:</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Budget/Policy Framework:</b>	<b>Yes</b>
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<b>Appendices:</b>	<b>1. Treasury Management Strategy 2016/17</b>		

## FOR GENERAL RELEASE

### 1.0 Purpose of Report

- 1.1 To formally recommend that full Council approves the attached Treasury Management Strategy, the prudential indicators and note the Treasury activities.

### 2.0 Recommendations

- 2.1 Audit and Governance Committee is asked to **RECOMMEND** that the Treasury Management Strategy be approved.

- 2.2 Council is asked to **RESOLVE** that:

- (1) The Treasury Management Strategy at Appendix 1 be approved;
- (2) The authorised borrowing limit be approved at:-
  - a) 2016/17 £30m
  - b) 2017/18 £30m
  - c) 2018/19 £30m
- (3) The prudential indicators set on in section two of the strategy be approved.

### 3.0 Background and Key Issues

- 3.1 The Council's financial profile has changed significantly since the transfer of Housing Stock to Gloucester City Homes in March 2015. At the end of March 2015, the Council was holding market debt from the stock transfer due to uncertainty in the market around debt premia and as a result was in an over-borrowed position. The Council was able to repay the market debt at the start of the 2015/16 financial year, returning the Council to an under borrowed position.

- 3.2 The 2016/17 treasury management strategy proposes to continue operating within an under-borrowing position. This under-borrowing reflects that the Council resources such as reserves and provisions will have reduced debt rather than be externally invested. This strategy is sensible, at this point in time, for two reasons. Firstly, there is no differential between the marginal borrowing rate and investment rate so there is nothing to be gained by investing Council resources externally. Secondly, by using the resources to reduce debt the Council will reduce exposure to investment counterparty risk.
- 3.3 There will be short term cashflow balances that will be invested for short periods within the year. Section 4 of the strategy outlines the Annual Investment Strategy; in particular it outlines the creditworthiness policy through the use of credit ratings.
- 3.4 The borrowing strategy is to utilise investments to reduce short term borrowing. Once investments have been applied it is anticipated that any new debt will be short term as the current market rates are attractive and this also maximises future flexibility.
- 3.5 The strategy allows for either debt rescheduling or new long term fixed rate borrowing in place of short term borrowing if circumstances were to change during 2016/17.
- 3.6 The strategy also includes the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement. This policy continues with the practice approved last year. MRP is the revenue charge to reduce debt and is only required by the General Fund. This option provides for a reduction in the borrowing need over the approximate asset life. For clarity the options for reduction are explained and can either be through an annuity calculation (providing a consistent overall annual borrowing charge) or straight line (where the principal repayment is the same each year).

#### **4.0 Alternative Options Considered**

- 4.1 The following option has been considered:

The potential to borrow long term rather than sort term. This remains an option should interest rates change but at the moment short terms rates are only 0.50% whereas long term rates are over 3% (25 years plus).

#### **5.0 Reasons for Recommendations**

- 5.1 As outlined in the legal implications the recommendations require Council approval.

#### **6.0 Future Work and Conclusions**

- 6.1 The Treasury Management Strategy provides a logical basis to fund the Council's capital financing requirement. The Council will continue to monitor the under borrowed strategy and is prepared to adapt this strategy if there is changes within the markets.

#### **7.0 Financial Implications**

- 7.1 The expenditure and income arising from treasury management activities are included within the Council General Fund budget.

## **8.0 Asset Based Community Development (ABCD) Considerations**

8.1 This report notes the Treasury Strategy of the Council. There are no ABCD implications from this report.

## **9.0 Legal Implications**

9.1 The Council is required to have a Treasury Management Strategy to meet the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, CLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and CLG Investment Guidance.

## **10.0 Risk & Opportunity Management Implications**

10.1 There is a risk that short term and long term interest rates could increase and this will be monitored both in-house and by the Council Treasury Management Advisor, Capita Asset Services. In this event the risk will be managed through the opportunities either to reschedule debt or new long term fixed rate borrowing in place of short term borrowing.

10.2 The risk of deposits not being returned by the counterparty is minimised by only investing short term cash flow monies with counterparties on the approved lending list. All counterparties on this list meet minimum credit rating criteria, ensuring the risk is kept extremely low although not eliminated.

## **11.0 People Impact Assessment (PIA):**

11.1 A PIA screening assessment has been undertaken and the impact is neutral. A full PIA is not required.

## **12.0 Other Corporate Implications**

### Community Safety

12.1 None

### Sustainability

12.2 None

### Staffing & Trade Union

12.3 None

## **Background Documents:**

Local Government Act 2003  
CIPFA Treasury Management Code  
CIPFA Prudential Code  
CLG MRP Guidance

## Appendix 1: Treasury Management Strategy 2016/17

### 1. INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

*"The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."*

#### 1.2 Reporting requirements

The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.

**Prudential and Treasury Indicators and Treasury Strategy** (this report) - The first, and most important report covers:

- the capital plans (including prudential indicators);
- a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- the treasury management strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and
- an investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

**A mid year treasury management report** – This will update members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision

**An annual treasury report** – This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

## **Scrutiny**

The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Audit and Governance Committee.

### **1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2016/17**

The strategy for 2016/17 covers two main areas:

#### **Capital issues**

- the capital plans and the prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

#### **Treasury management issues**

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, CLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and CLG Investment Guidance.

### **1.4 Training**

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to members responsible for scrutiny. Training for Members was provided in 2014/15, with an update provided in 15/16 for new members. Further training will be arranged as required during 16/17 following full Council elections. The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed.

### **1.5 Treasury management consultants**

The Council uses Capita Asset Services, Treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

## 2. THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2016/17 – 2018/19

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

### 2.1 Capital expenditure

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts:

<b>Capital expenditure</b>	<b>2014/15 Actual £m</b>	<b>2015/16 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2016/17 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2017/18 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2018/19 Estimate £m</b>
Corporate Director 1	0.699	1.236	0.622	0.557	0.557
Corporate Director 2	0.334	1.802	0.976	0.565	0.420
Regeneration & Economic Development	7.062	5.616	8.774	1.054	0.100
Finance & Business Improvements	0.169	0.256	0.400	0.300	0.00
<b>Total Non-HRA</b>	<b>8.264</b>	<b>8.910</b>	<b>10.772</b>	<b>2.476</b>	<b>1.077</b>
<b>HRA</b>	<b>7.126</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>15.390</b>	<b>8.910</b>	<b>10.772</b>	<b>2.476</b>	<b>1.077</b>

The Council has other long term liabilities which relate to the difference between the Local Government Pension Liabilities and Assets. These do not have any treasury impact on Gloucester City Council as the Pension Fund is managed by Gloucestershire County Council. Therefore, other long term liabilities have been excluded from this strategy.

The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

<b>Capital expenditure</b>	<b>2014/15 Actual £m</b>	<b>2015/16 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2016/17 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2017/18 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2018/19 Estimate £m</b>
Total	16.110	8.910	10.772	2.476	1.077
<b>Financed by:</b>					
Capital receipts	2.142	4.797	2.856	0.657	0
Capital grants	0.906	3.889	7.916	1.819	0.729
HRA Major repairs	2.022	0	0	0	0
HRA Revenue	4.783	0	0	0	0
<b>Net financing need for the year</b>	<b>6.257</b>	<b>0.224</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.348</b>

## 2.2 The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the borrowing need in line with each assets life.

The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

	<b>2014/15 Actual £m</b>	<b>2015/16 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2016/17 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2017/18 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2018/19 Estimate £m</b>
<b>Capital Financing Requirement</b>					
<b>Total CFR</b>	<b>22.837</b>	<b>20.928</b>	<b>20.422</b>	<b>19.952</b>	<b>19.805</b>
<b>Movement in CFR</b>	<b>(58.038)</b>	<b>(1.910)</b>	<b>(0.506)</b>	<b>(0.470)</b>	<b>(0.147)</b>

<b>Movement in CFR represented by</b>					
Net financing need for the year (above)	6.257	0.224	0.00	0.00	0.348
Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements	(1.545)	(2.134)	(0.506)	(0.470)	(0.495)
Housing Stock Transfer	(62.750)	0	0	0	0
<b>Movement in CFR</b>	<b>(58.038)</b>	<b>(1.910)</b>	<b>(0.506)</b>	<b>(0.470)</b>	<b>(0.147)</b>

### 2.3 Minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

CLG regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve **an MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:

For capital expenditure incurred before 1 April 2008 or which in the future will be Supported Capital Expenditure, the MRP policy will be:

- **Existing practice** - MRP will follow the existing practice outlined in former CLG regulations (option 1); this option provides for an approximate 4% reduction in the borrowing need (CFR) each year.

From 1 April 2008 for all unsupported borrowing (including PFI and finance leases) the MRP policy will be:

- **Asset life method** – MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance with the regulations (this option must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction) (option 3); This option provide for a reduction in the borrowing need over approximately the asset's life.

### 2.4 Affordability prudential indicators

The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. The Council is asked to approve the following indicators:

### 2.5 Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

%	2014/15 Actual	2015/16 Estimate	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate
Ratio	4.73%	5.37%	4.97%	4.83%	5.03%

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

### 2.6 Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on Council Tax

This indicator identifies the revenue costs associated with proposed changes to the three year capital programme recommended in this budget report compared to the Council's existing approved commitments and current plans. The assumptions are based on the

budget, but will invariably include some estimates, such as the level of Government support, which are not published over a three year period.

### Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on the band D Council Tax

£	2014/15 Actual £	2015/16 Estimate £	2016/17 Estimate £	2017/18 Estimate £	2018/19 Estimate £
<b>Council Tax - Band D</b>	1.43	2.45	0	0	0.52

## 3. BORROWING

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

### 3.1 Current portfolio position

The Council's treasury portfolio position at 31 March 2015, with forward projections are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt (the treasury management operations), against the underlying capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

	2014/15 Actual £m	2015/16 Estimate £m	2016/17 Estimate £m	2017/18 Estimate £m	2018/19 Estimate £m
<b>External Debt</b>					
Debt at 1 April	71.142	43.997	15.000	15.000	15.000
Expected change in Debt	(27.145)	(28.997)	0	0	0.500
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)	0	0	0	0	0
Expected change in OLTL	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Actual gross debt at 31 March</b>	<b>43.997</b>	<b>15.000</b>	<b>15.000</b>	<b>15.000</b>	<b>15.500</b>
<b>The Capital Financing Requirement</b>	<b>22.837</b>	<b>20.928</b>	<b>20.422</b>	<b>19.952</b>	<b>19.805</b>
<b>Under / (over) borrowing</b>	<b>(21.160)</b>	<b>5.928</b>	<b>5.422</b>	<b>4.952</b>	<b>4.305</b>

At the 31st March 2015 there was an over borrowing of £21.160m compared with the capital financing requirement. The 15/16 estimate is an under borrowed position. The over borrowed position at the 31<sup>st</sup> March 2015 was the result of the Council holding market debt relating to the stock transfer while uncertainty remained in the market

around debt premia. Certainty returned to the markets early in 2015/16, the Council repaid debt and returned to an under borrowed position.

The Head of Finance reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

### 3.2 Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity

**The operational boundary.** This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt.

Operational boundary	2015/16 Estimate £m	2016/17 Estimate £m	2017/18 Estimate £m	2018/19 Estimate £m
Debt	45	25	25	25
Other long term liabilities	0	0	0	0
Total	45	25	25	25

**The authorised limit for external debt.** A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

1. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.
2. The Council is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

Authorised limit	2015/16 Estimate £m	2016/17 Estimate £m	2017/18 Estimate £m	2018/19 Estimate £m
Debt	50	30	30	30
Other long term liabilities	0	0	0	0
Total	50	30	30	30

### 3.3 Prospects for interest rates

The Council has appointed Capita Asset Services as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives our central view:

Annual Average %	Bank Rate %	PWLB Borrowing Rates % (including certainty rate adjustment)		
		5 year	25 year	50 year
Mar 2016	0.50	2.00	3.40	3.20
Jun 2016	0.50	2.10	3.40	3.20
Sep 2016	0.50	2.20	3.50	3.30
Dec 2016	0.75	2.30	3.60	3.40
Mar 2017	0.75	2.40	3.70	3.50
Jun 2017	1.00	2.50	3.70	3.60
Sep 2017	1.00	2.60	3.80	3.70
Dec 2017	1.25	2.70	3.90	3.80
Mar 2018	1.25	2.80	4.00	3.90
Jun 2018	1.50	2.90	4.00	3.90
Sept 2018	1.50	3.00	4.10	4.00
Dec 2018	1.75	3.10	4.10	4.00
Mar 2019	1.75	3.20	4.10	4.00

**UK.** UK GDP growth rates in 2013 of 2.2% and 2.9% in 2014 were the strongest growth rates of any G7 country; the 2014 growth rate was also the strongest UK rate since 2006 and the 2015 growth rate is likely to be a leading rate in the G7 again, probably being second to the US. However, quarter 1 of 2015 was weak at +0.4% (+2.9% y/y) though there was a rebound in quarter 2 to +0.7% (+2.4% y/y) before weakening again to +0.5% (2.3% y/y) in quarter 3. The November Bank of England Inflation Report included a forecast for growth to remain around 2.5 – 2.7% over the next three years, driven mainly by strong consumer demand as the squeeze on the disposable incomes of consumers has been reversed by a recovery in wage inflation at the same time that CPI inflation has fallen to, or near to, zero since February 2015. Investment expenditure is also expected to support growth. However, since the August Inflation report was issued, most worldwide economic statistics have been weak and the November Inflation Report flagged up particular concerns for the potential impact on the UK.

The Inflation Report was also notably subdued in respect of the forecasts for inflation; this was expected to barely get back up to the 2% target within the 2-3 year time horizon. The increase in the forecast for inflation at the three year horizon was the biggest in a decade and at the two year horizon was the biggest since February 2013. However, the first round of falls in oil, gas and food prices over late 2014 and also in the first half

2015, will fall out of the 12 month calculation of CPI during late 2015 / early 2016 but a second, more recent round of falls in fuel prices will now delay a significant tick up in inflation from around zero: this is now expected to get back to around 1% in the second half of 2016 and not get to near 2% until 2017, though the forecasts in the Report itself were for an even slower rate of increase. There is considerable uncertainty around how quickly pay and CPI inflation will rise in the next few years and this makes it difficult to forecast when the MPC will decide to make a start on increasing Bank Rate.

**USA.** The American economy made a strong comeback after a weak first quarter's growth at +0.6% (annualised), to grow by no less than 3.9% in quarter 2 of 2015, but then pulled back to 2.1% in quarter 3. The run of strong monthly increases in nonfarm payrolls figures for growth in employment in 2015 has prepared the way for the Fed. to embark on its long awaited first increase in rates of 0.25% at its December meeting. However, the accompanying message with this first increase was that further increases will be at a much slower rate, and to a much lower ultimate ceiling, than in previous business cycles, mirroring comments by our own MPC.

**EZ.** In the Eurozone, the ECB fired its big bazooka in January 2015 in unleashing a massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy up high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries. This programme of €60bn of monthly purchases started in March 2015 and it is intended to run initially to September 2016. This appears to have had a positive effect in helping a recovery in consumer and business confidence and a start to an improvement in economic growth. GDP growth rose to 0.5% in quarter 1 2015 (1.0% y/y) but came in at +0.4% (+1.5% y/y) in quarter 2 and +0.3% in quarter 3. However, this lacklustre progress in 2015 together with the recent downbeat Chinese and emerging markets news, has prompted comments by the ECB that it stands ready to strengthen this programme of QE by extending its time frame and / or increasing its size in order to get inflation up from the current level of around zero towards its target of 2% and to help boost the rate of growth in the EZ.

Greece. During July, Greece finally capitulated to EU demands to implement a major programme of austerity and is now cooperating fully with EU demands. An €86bn third bailout package has since been agreed though it did nothing to address the unsupportable size of total debt compared to GDP. However, huge damage has been done to the Greek banking system and economy by the resistance of the Syriza Government, elected in January, to EU demands. The surprise general election in September gave the Syriza government a mandate to stay in power to implement austerity measures. However, there are major doubts as to whether the size of cuts and degree of reforms required can be fully implemented and so Greek exit from the euro may only have been delayed by this latest bailout.

Portugal and Spain. The general elections in September and December respectively have opened up new areas of political risk where the previous right wing reform-focused pro-austerity mainstream political parties have lost power. A left wing / communist coalition has taken power in Portugal which is heading towards unravelling previous pro austerity reforms. This outcome could be replicated in Spain. This has created nervousness in bond and equity markets for these countries which has the potential to spill over and impact on the whole Eurozone project.

- Investment returns are likely to remain relatively low during 2016/17 and beyond;

- Borrowing interest rates have been highly volatile during 2015 as alternating bouts of good and bad news have promoted optimism, and then pessimism, in financial markets. Gilt yields have continued to remain at historically phenomenally low levels during 2015. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances, has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in later times, when authorities will not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance new capital expenditure and/or to refinance maturing debt;
- There will remain a cost of carry to any new borrowing which causes an increase in investments as this will incur a revenue loss between borrowing costs and investment returns.

### 3.4 Borrowing strategy

The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is relatively high.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2016/17 treasury operations. The Head of Finance will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates* (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered.
- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than that currently forecast*, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the start date and in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised with the likely action that fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are still lower than they will be in the next few years.

Any decisions will be reported to the appropriate decision making body at the next available opportunity.

### 3.5 Treasury management limits on activity

The purpose of treasury management limits are to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs/ improve performance. The indicators are:

- Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies a maximum limit for variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments
- Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates;

- Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19
<b>Interest rate exposures</b>			
	<b>Upper</b>	<b>Upper</b>	<b>Upper</b>
<b>Limits on fixed interest rates based on net debt</b>	100%	100%	100%
<b>Limits on variable interest rates based on net debt</b>	100%	100%	100%
<b>Maturity structure of fixed and variable interest rate borrowing 2016/17</b>			
	<b>Lower</b>	<b>Upper</b>	
Under 12 months	0%	100%	
12 months to 2 years	0%	100%	
2 years to 5 years	0%	100%	
5 years to 10 years	0%	100%	
10 years and above	0%	100%	

### 3.6 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

### 3.7 Debt rescheduling

As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term fixed interest rates, there may be potential opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the current treasury position and the size of the cost of debt repayment (premiums incurred).

The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:

- the generation of cash savings and / or discounted cash flow savings;
- helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;
- enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.

All rescheduling will be reported to the Cabinet, at the earliest meeting following its action.

### **3.8 Municipal Bond Agency**

It is likely that the Municipal Bond Agency, currently in the process of being set up, will be offering loans to local authorities in the near future. It is also hoped that the borrowing rates will be lower than those offered by the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB). This Authority intends to make use of this new source of borrowing as and when appropriate.

## **4. ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY**

### **4.1 Introduction: changes to credit rating methodology**

The main rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's) have, through much of the financial crisis, provided some institutions with a ratings "uplift" due to implied levels of sovereign support. Commencing in 2015, in response to the evolving regulatory regime, all three agencies have begun removing these "uplifts" with the timing of the process determined by regulatory progress at the national level. The process has been part of a wider reassessment of methodologies by each of the rating agencies. In addition to the removal of implied support, new methodologies are now taking into account additional factors, such as regulatory capital levels. In some cases, these factors have "netted" each other off, to leave underlying ratings either unchanged or little changed. A consequence of these new methodologies is that they have also lowered the importance of the (Fitch) Support and Viability ratings and have seen the (Moody's) Financial Strength rating withdrawn by the agency.

In keeping with the agencies' new methodologies, the rating element of our own credit assessment process now focuses solely on the Short and Long Term ratings of an institution. While this is the same process that has always been used for Standard & Poor's, this has been a change in the use of Fitch and Moody's ratings. It is important to stress that the other key elements to our process, namely the assessment of Rating Watch and Outlook information as well as the Credit Default Swap (CDS) overlay have not been changed.

The evolving regulatory environment, in tandem with the rating agencies' new methodologies also means that sovereign ratings are now of lesser importance in the assessment process. Where through the crisis, clients typically assigned the highest sovereign rating to their criteria, the new regulatory environment is attempting to break the link between sovereign support and domestic financial institutions. While this authority understands the changes that have taken place, it will continue to specify a minimum sovereign rating of ..... This is in relation to the fact that the underlying domestic and where appropriate, international, economic and wider political and social background will still have an influence on the ratings of a financial institution.

It is important to stress that these rating agency changes do not reflect any changes in the underlying status or credit quality of the institution. They are merely reflective of a reassessment of rating agency methodologies in light of enacted and future expected

changes to the regulatory environment in which financial institutions operate. While some banks have received lower credit ratings as a result of these changes, this does not mean that they are suddenly less credit worthy than they were formerly. Rather, in the majority of cases, this mainly reflects the fact that implied sovereign government support has effectively been withdrawn from banks. They are now expected to have sufficiently strong balance sheets to be able to withstand foreseeable adverse financial circumstances without government support. In fact, in many cases, the balance sheets of banks are now much more robust than they were before the 2008 financial crisis when they had higher ratings than now. However, this is not universally applicable, leaving some entities with modestly lower ratings than they had through much of the “support” phase of the financial crisis.

## **4.2 Investment policy**

The Council’s investment policy has regard to the CLG’s Guidance on Local Government Investments (“the Guidance”) and the revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes (“the CIPFA TM Code”). The Council’s investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, then return.

In accordance with the above guidance from the CLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

Ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as “credit default swaps” and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in appendix 5.3 under the ‘specified’ and ‘non-specified’ investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council’s treasury management practices – schedules.

## **4.3 Creditworthiness policy**

This Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by Capita Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- CDS spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council to determine the suggested duration for investments. The Council will therefore use counterparties within the following durational bands:

- Yellow 5 years \*
- Dark pink 5 years for Enhanced money market funds (EMMFs) with a credit score of 1.25
- Light pink 5 years for Enhanced money market funds (EMMFs) with a credit score of 1.5
- Purple 2 years
- Blue 1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks)
- Orange 1 year
- Red 6 months
- Green 100 days
- No colour not to be used
- 

Y	Pi1	Pi2	P	B	O	R	G	N/C
1	1.25	1.5	2	3	4	5	6	7
Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 2yrs	Up to 1yr	Up to 1yr	Up to 6mths	Up to 100days	No Colour

	Colour (and long term rating where applicable)	Money and/or % Limit	Time Limit
Banks	yellow	£5m	5yrs
Banks	purple	£5m	2 yrs
Banks	orange	£5m	1 yr
Banks – part nationalised	blue	£5m	1 yr
Banks	red	£5m	6 mths
Banks	green	£5m	100 days
Banks	No colour	Not to be used	
Limit 3 category – Council’s banker (not meeting Banks 1)	Barclays Bank	100 %	1 day
DMADF	AAA	unlimited	6 months
Local authorities	n/a	100 %	1yrs
	Fund rating	Money and/or % Limit	Time Limit
Money market funds	AAA	100 %	liquid
Enhanced money market funds with a credit score of 1.25	Dark pink / AAA	100 %	liquid
Enhanced money market funds with a credit score of 1.5	Light pink / AAA	100 %	liquid

The Capita Asset Services’ creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings. Furthermore, by using a risk weighted scoring system, it does not give undue preponderance to just one agency’s ratings.

Typically the minimum credit ratings criteria the Council use will be a Short Term rating (Fitch or equivalents) of F1 and a Long Term rating of A-. There may be occasions when the counterparty ratings from one rating agency are marginally lower than these ratings but may still be used. In these instances consideration will be given to the whole range of ratings available, or other topical market information, to support their use.

All credit ratings will be monitored daily. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Capita Asset Services’ creditworthiness service.

- if a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the Council’s minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.

- in addition to the use of credit ratings the Council will be advised of information in movements in credit default swap spreads against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a daily basis via its Passport website, provided exclusively to it by Capita Asset Services. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Council's lending list.

Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Council will also use market data and market information, information on any external support for banks to help support its decision making process.

#### 4.4 Country limits

The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch or equivalent. The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 5.5. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

#### 4.5 Investment strategy

**In-house funds.** Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

**Investment returns expectations.** Bank Rate is forecast to remain unchanged at 0.5% before starting to rise from quarter 2 of 2016. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2016/17 0.75%
- 2017/18 1.25%
- 2018/19 1.75%

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to 100 days during each financial year for the next eight years are as follows:

2016/17	0.60%
2017/18	1.25%
2018/19	1.75%
2019/20	2.25%
2020/21	2.50%
2021/22	3.00%
2022/23	3.00%
Later years	3.00%

The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently to the downside (i.e. start of increases in Bank Rate occurs later). However, should the pace of growth quicken and / or forecasts for increases in inflation rise, there could be an upside risk.

**Investment treasury indicator and limit** - total principal funds invested for greater than 364 days. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

The Council is asked to approve the treasury indicator and limit: -

<b>Maximum principal sums invested &gt; 364 days</b>			
	<b>2016/17</b>	<b>2017/18</b>	<b>2018/19</b>
Principal sums invested > 364 days	£m Nil	£m Nil	£m Nil

#### **4.6 End of year investment report**

At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

#### **5. APPENDICES**

1. Interest rate forecasts
2. Economic background
3. Treasury management practice 1 – credit and counterparty risk management
4. Approved countries for investments
5. Treasury management scheme of delegation
6. The treasury management role of the section 151 officer

## 5.1 APPENDIX: Interest Rate Forecasts 2016 – 2019

PWLB rates and forecast shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.

Capita Asset Services Interest Rate View													
	Mar-16	Jun-16	Sep-16	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19
<b>Bank Rate View</b>	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	1.75%
3 Month LIBID	0.50%	0.50%	0.60%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.10%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.60%	1.80%	1.90%
6 Month LIBID	0.70%	0.70%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.20%	1.30%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	2.00%	2.20%
12 Month LIBID	1.00%	1.00%	1.10%	1.20%	1.30%	1.50%	1.60%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.30%	2.40%
5yr PWLB Rate	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%
10yr PWLB Rate	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%	3.70%
25yr PWLB Rate	3.40%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.10%	4.10%	4.10%
50yr PWLB Rate	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%
<b>Bank Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	1.75%
Capital Economics	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>5yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%
Capital Economics	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.50%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>10yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%	3.70%
Capital Economics	3.35%	3.45%	3.45%	3.55%	3.65%	3.75%	3.85%	3.95%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>25yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	3.40%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.10%	4.10%	4.10%
Capital Economics	3.35%	3.45%	3.45%	3.55%	3.65%	3.75%	3.85%	3.95%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>50yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%
Capital Economics	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	-	-	-	-	-

## 5.2 APPENDIX: Economic Background

**UK.** UK GDP growth rates in of 2.2% in 2013 and 2.9% in 2014 were the strongest growth rates of any G7 country; the 2014 growth rate was also the strongest UK rate since 2006 and the 2015 growth rate is likely to be a leading rate in the G7 again. However, quarter 1 of 2015 was weak at +0.4%, although there was a short lived rebound in quarter 2 to +0.7% before it subsided again to +0.5% (+2.3% y/y) in quarter 3. The Bank of England's November Inflation Report included a forecast for growth to remain around 2.5% – 2.7% over the next three years. For this recovery, however, to become more balanced and sustainable in the longer term, it still needs to move away from dependence on consumer expenditure and the housing market to manufacturing and investment expenditure. The strong growth since 2012 has resulted in unemployment falling quickly to a current level of 5.2%.

The MPC has been particularly concerned that the squeeze on the disposable incomes of consumers should be reversed by wage inflation rising back above the level of CPI inflation in order to underpin a sustainable recovery. It has, therefore, been encouraging in 2015 to see wage inflation rising significantly above CPI inflation which has been around zero since February. However, it is unlikely that the MPC would start raising rates until wage inflation was expected to consistently stay over 3%, as a labour productivity growth rate of around 2% would mean that net labour unit costs would still only be rising by about 1% y/y. The Inflation Report was notably subdued in respect of the forecasts for CPI inflation; this was expected to barely get back up to the 2% target within the 2-3 year time horizon. The increase in the forecast for inflation at the three year horizon was the biggest in a decade and at the two year horizon it was the biggest since February 2013. However, the first round of falls in oil, gas and food prices in late 2014 and in the first half 2015, will fall out of the 12 month calculation of CPI during late 2015 / early 2016 but only to be followed by a second, more recent, round of falls in fuel prices which will now delay a significant tick up in inflation from around zero. CPI inflation is now expected to get back to around 1% in the second half of 2016 and not get near to 2% until 2017, though the forecasts in the Report itself were for an even slower rate of increase.

There is, therefore, considerable uncertainty around how quickly pay and CPI inflation will rise in the next few years and this makes it difficult to forecast when the MPC will decide to make a start on increasing Bank Rate. There are also concerns around the fact that the central banks of the UK and US currently have few monetary policy options left to them given that central rates are near to zero and huge QE is already in place. There are, accordingly, arguments that they need to raise rates sooner, rather than later, so as to have some options available for use if there was another major financial crisis in the near future. But it is unlikely that either would raise rates until they are sure that growth was securely embedded and 'noflation' was not a significant threat.

The forecast for the first increase in Bank Rate has, therefore, been pushed back progressively during 2015 from Q4 2015 to Q2 2016. Increases after that are also likely to be at a much slower pace, and to much lower final levels than prevailed before 2008, as increases in Bank Rate will have a much bigger effect on heavily indebted consumers and householders than they did before 2008.

The Government's revised Budget in July eased the pace of cut backs from achieving a budget surplus in 2018/19 to achieving that in 2019/20 and this timetable was maintained in the November Budget.

**USA.** GDP growth in 2014 of 2.4% was followed by Q1 2015 growth, which was depressed by exceptionally bad winter weather, at only +0.6% (annualised). However, growth rebounded remarkably strongly in Q2 to 3.9% (annualised) before falling back to +2.1% in Q3.

Until the turmoil in financial markets in August, caused by fears about the slowdown in Chinese growth, it had been strongly expected that the Fed. would start to increase rates in September. The Fed pulled back from that first increase due to global risks which might depress US growth and put downward pressure on inflation, as well as a 20% appreciation of the dollar which has caused the Fed. to lower its growth forecasts. Although the non-farm payrolls figures for growth in employment in August and September were disappointingly weak, the October figure was stunningly strong while November was also reasonably strong; this, therefore, opened up the way for the Fed. to embark on its first increase in rates of 0.25% at its December meeting. However, the accompanying message with this first increase was that further increases will be at a much slower rate, and to a much lower ultimate ceiling, than in previous business cycles, mirroring comments by our own MPC.

**EZ.** In the Eurozone, the ECB fired its big bazooka in January 2015 in unleashing a massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy up high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries. This programme of €60bn of monthly purchases started in March 2015 and it is intended to run initially to September 2016. This appears to have had a positive effect in helping a recovery in consumer and business confidence and a start to an improvement in economic growth. GDP growth rose to 0.5% in quarter 1 2015 (1.0% y/y) but came in at +0.4% (+1.5% y/y) in quarter 2 and +0.3% in quarter 3. However, this more recent lacklustre progress, combined with the recent downbeat Chinese and emerging markets news, has prompted comments by the ECB that it stands ready to strengthen this programme of QE by extending its time frame and / or increasing its size in order to get inflation up from the current level of around zero towards its target of 2%. The ECB will also aim to help boost the rate of growth in the EZ.

**Greece.** During July, Greece finally capitulated to EU demands to implement a major programme of austerity. An €86bn third bailout package has since been agreed although it did nothing to address the unsupportable size of total debt compared to GDP. However, huge damage has been done to the Greek banking system and economy by the initial resistance of the Syriza Government, elected in January, to EU demands. The surprise general election in September gave the Syriza government a mandate to stay in power to implement austerity measures. However, there are major doubts as to whether the size of cuts and degree of reforms required can be fully implemented and so a Greek exit from the euro may only have been delayed by this latest bailout.

Portugal and Spain. The general elections in September and December respectively have opened up new areas of political risk where the previous right wing reform-focused pro-austerity mainstream political parties have lost power. A left wing / communist coalition has taken power in Portugal which is heading towards unravelling previous pro austerity reforms. This outcome could be replicated in Spain. This has created

nervousness in bond and equity markets for these countries which has the potential to spill over and impact on the whole Eurozone project.

**China and Japan.** Japan is causing considerable concern as the increase in sales tax in April 2014 suppressed consumer expenditure and growth. In Q2 2015 quarterly growth shrank by -0.2% after a short burst of strong growth of 1.1% during Q1, but then came back to +0.3% in Q3 after the first estimate had indicated that Japan had fallen back into recession; this would have been the fourth recession in five years. Japan has been hit hard by the downturn in China during 2015 and there are continuing concerns as to how effective efforts by the Abe government to stimulate growth, and increase the rate of inflation from near zero, are likely to prove when it has already fired the first two of its 'arrows' of reform but has dithered about firing the third, deregulation of protected and inefficient areas of the economy.

As for China, the Government has been very active during 2015 in implementing several stimulus measures to try to ensure the economy hits the growth target of 7% for the current year and to bring some stability after the major fall in the onshore Chinese stock market during the summer. Many commentators are concerned that recent growth figures could have been massaged to hide a downturn to a lower growth figure. There are also major concerns as to the creditworthiness of much of the bank lending to corporates and local government during the post 2008 credit expansion period. Overall, China is still expected to achieve a growth figure that the EU would be envious of. Nevertheless, concerns about whether the Chinese economy could be heading for a hard landing, and the volatility of the Chinese stock market, which was the precursor to falls in world financial markets in August and September, remain a concern.

**Emerging countries.** There are also considerable concerns about the vulnerability of some emerging countries and their corporates which are getting caught in a perfect storm. Having borrowed massively in dollar denominated debt since the financial crisis (as investors searched for yield by channelling investment cash away from western economies with dismal growth, depressed bond yields and near zero interest rates into emerging countries) there is now a strong flow back to those western economies with strong growth and an imminent rise in interest rates and bond yields.

This change in investors' strategy, and the massive reverse cash flow, has depressed emerging country currencies and, together with a rise in expectations of a start to central interest rate increases in the US, has helped to cause the dollar to appreciate significantly. In turn, this has made it much more costly for emerging countries to service their dollar denominated debt at a time when their earnings from commodities are depressed. There are also likely to be major issues when previously borrowed debt comes to maturity and requires refinancing at much more expensive rates.

Corporates (worldwide) heavily involved in mineral extraction and / or the commodities market may also be at risk and this could also cause volatility in equities and safe haven flows to bonds. Financial markets may also be buffeted by the sovereign wealth funds of those countries that are highly exposed to falls in commodity prices and which, therefore, may have to liquidate investments in order to cover national budget deficits.

## **CAPITA ASSET SERVICES FORWARD VIEW**

Economic forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. Our Bank Rate forecasts, (and also MPC decisions), will be liable to further

amendment depending on how economic data evolves over time. Capita Asset Services undertook its last review of interest rate forecasts on 9 November 2015 shortly after the publication of the quarterly Bank of England Inflation Report. There is much volatility in rates and bond yields as news ebbs and flows in negative or positive ways. This latest forecast includes a first increase in Bank Rate in quarter 2 of 2016.

The overall trend in the longer term will be for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise when economic recovery is firmly established accompanied by rising inflation and consequent increases in Bank Rate, and the eventual unwinding of QE. Increasing investor confidence in eventual world economic recovery is also likely to compound this effect as recovery will encourage investors to switch from bonds to equities.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is currently evenly balanced. Only time will tell just how long this current period of strong economic growth will last; it also remains exposed to vulnerabilities in a number of key areas.

However, the overall balance of risks to our Bank Rate forecast is probably to the downside, i.e. the first increase, and subsequent increases, may be delayed further if recovery in GDP growth, and forecasts for inflation increases, are lower than currently expected. Market expectations in November, (based on short sterling), for the first Bank Rate increase are currently around mid-year 2016.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- Geopolitical risks in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia, increasing safe haven flows.
- UK economic growth turns significantly weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partners - the EU, US and China.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
- Recapitalisation of European banks requiring more government financial support.
- Emerging country economies, currencies and corporates destabilised by falling commodity prices and / or the start of Fed. rate increases, causing a flight to safe havens

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- Uncertainty around the risk of a UK exit from the EU.
- The commencement by the US Federal Reserve of increases in the Fed. funds rate causing a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds as opposed to equities and leading to a major flight from bonds to equities.
- UK inflation returning to significantly higher levels than in the wider EU and US, causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

### 5.3 APPENDIX: Treasury Management Practice (TMP1) – Credit and Counterparty Risk Management

**SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** All such investments will be sterling denominated, with maturities up to maximum of 1 year, meeting the minimum ‘high’ quality criteria where applicable.

**NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** These are any investments which do not meet the specified investment criteria. A maximum of 50% \*\* will be held in aggregate in non-specified investment

A variety of investment instruments will be used, subject to the credit quality of the institution, and depending on the type of investment made it will fall into one of the above categories.

The criteria, time limits and monetary limits applying to institutions or investment vehicles are:

	Minimum credit criteria / colour band	** Max % of total investments/ £ limit per institution	Max. maturity period
<b>DMADF – UK Government</b>	N/A	<b>100%</b>	<b>6 months</b>
UK Government gilts	UK sovereign rating	50%	5 years
UK Government Treasury blis	UK sovereign rating	50%	5 years
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AAA (or state your criteria if different)	50%	6 months
Money market funds	AAA	100%	Liquid
Enhanced money market funds with a credit score of 1.25	AAA	100%	Liquid
Enhanced money market funds with a credit score of 1.5	AAA	100%	Liquid
Local authorities	N/A	100%	1 years
Term deposits with banks and building societies	Blue Orange Red Green No Colour	£5M £5M £5M 0	1 year 1 year 6 Months 100 days Not for use

CDs or corporate bonds with banks and building societies	Blue	0	1 year
	Orange	0	1 year
	Red	0	6 Months
	Green	0	100 days
	No Colour		Not for use
Gilt funds	UK sovereign rating	Nil	
Property funds		Nil	

## 5.4 APPENDIX: Approved countries for investments

*Based on lowest available rating*

AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Netherlands
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Finland
- U.K.
- U.S.A.

AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- Qatar

AA-

- Belgium

## **5.5 APPENDIX: Treasury management scheme of delegation**

### **(i) Council**

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities;
- approval of annual strategy.

### **(ii) Committees/Council**

- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices;
- budget consideration and approval;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations;
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

### **(iii) Person(s) with responsibility for scrutiny**

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

## **5.6 APPENDIX: The treasury management role of the section 151 officer**

### **The S151 (responsible) officer**

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.